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This paper reviews recent changes in the nature of wage inequality, and discusses 
proposed explanations for these changes.  Most of the discussion focuses on the case of 
the United States that has been studied in much more detail than other countries.  I first 
discuss the consensus that emerged on the sources of changes in inequality in the 1980s 
in Section 2, but raise several difficulties that were already apparent at the time.  In 
Section 3, I discuss in detail the more recent (since 1990) changes in inequality and 
explain how they pose further challenges for the explanations that were suggested for the 
1980s.  I also present some evidence from the Current Population Survey (CPS) to 
complement the discussion.   
The main message of Section 3 is that the nature of the changes in inequality has 
been dramatically altered over the last fifteen years.  While the growth in inequality in the 
1980s was pervasive, it has been concentrated at the top end of the distribution since 
then.  Sections 4 and 5 review possible explanations for these changes.   Section 4 
discusses the role of institutional factors, while Section 5 focuses on explanations based 
on demand factors and, in particular, technological change.  Finally, I conclude in Section 
6. 
  
2. The 1990s consensus 
A representative view of inequality in 1980 is Blinder (1980, p. 416) who remarked that 
￿￿when we turn to consider the distribution of economic welfare, --economic equality, 
as it is commonly called, the stylized fact is one of constancy.￿ Blinder￿s view was based 
on the latest data available at the time he wrote his paper that showed that ￿income 
inequality was just about the same in 1977￿ as in 1947.￿  In hindsight, we now realize 
that as Blinder and other observers at the time correctly saw a remarkably constant 
income distribution, the U.S. economy had entered a period of sharp increase in income 
and earnings inequality. 
  Throughout the 1980s, a number of researchers started noticing a definite trend in 
increasing inequality.  For instance, Bluestone and Harrison (1988) pointed out that the 
share of ￿low-wage￿ jobs had increased sharply in the first half of the 1980s.  This 
generated some controversy, in part because it was hard to tell at the time whether this   2
change was simply a consequence of the deep recession of 1981-1982.  Even in the 
second half of the 1980s, a number of papers concluded that recent changes in inequality 
were, at best, modest. For example, using data up to 1985, Blackburn and Bloom (1987) 
concluded that ￿The time profile of earnings inequality, measured across individual 
workers, has been quite flat since the late 1960s￿.  
  As interest grew for the issue of income and earnings inequality, the controversy 
of the mid- to late-1980s was rapidly resolved as new data clearly showed a sharp and 
continuing growth in inequality.  By the early 1990s, a set of highly influential papers by 
Bound and Johnson (1992), Katz and Murphy (1992), Levy and Murnane (1992), and 
Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993) established a wide consensus that i) inequality had been 
growing sharply in the 1980s, and ii) the primary factor behind the growth was the 
increase in the relative demand for skill.  The consensus was also that the relative demand 
for skill had been growing in the 1970s, but had been outstripped by the steep growth in 
educational attainment --the relative supply for skills￿linked to the entry of the highly-
educated baby boom generation in the labor market (Freeman, 1976).  For instance, Juhn, 
Murphy and Pierce (1993) argue that the within-group dimension of inequality had been 
growing throughout the 1970s and 1980s, thereby providing evidence that the relative 
demand for skills was already increasing in the 1970s.   
  While this first set of papers did not take a strong position on the source of the 
increase in the relative demand for skills, it became widely accepted during the early 
1990s that skill-biased technical change (SBTC), driven by the computer revolution, was 
the primary source of growth in the relative demand for skill (Krueger, 1993, Bound, 
Berman, and Griliches, 1994).   The leading alternative explanation, international trade or 
globalization, was generally rejected as the main source of the increase in the relative 
demand for skill.
1  
                                                 
1 Berman, Bound, and Griliches (1994) dismiss the trade explanation on the basis that most of the increase 
in the use of skilled labor happens within industries, while a traditional Heckscher-Ohlin would predict that 
changes should happen between industries.  More recently, however, authors such and Feenstra and Hanson 
(2003) have pointed out that trade in intermediate inputs, which can lead to within-industry changes, was a 
leading alternative explanation to SBTC for the increase in the relative demand for skill.  Their focus on 
intermediate, as opposed to final goods and services, is consistent with popular perceptions that off-shoring 
is now the key way in which globalization affects domestic employment and inequality.   3
  One last dimension of the 1990s consensus was that the increase in the relative 
demand for skill was pervasive, or ubiquitous, in the sense that all dimensions of 
inequality were growing.  For example, in a simple human capital model, wage inequality 
can increase because returns to education and experience increase, or because residual or 
within-group inequality increases.  Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993) show that all of these 
dimensions of inequality had been growing in the 1980s.  They attributed this to a 
pervasive increase in the relative demand for all dimensions of skill (education, 
experience, unobserved ability, etc.), that was later interpreted as being driven by SBTC.   
The consensus reached in the early 1990s about the importance of technological 
change in the growth in inequality has remained central in most of the subsequent 
research on inequality.  For instance, ten years after Levy and Murnane (1992) was 
published in the Journal of Economic Literature (JEL), the JEL published another survey 
(Acemoglu, 2002) on inequality.  Acemoglu (2002) again concludes that technological 
change, or at least a more sophisticated form of endogenous technological change, was 
the leading explanation for inequality growth in the United States throughout the 1970s, 
1980s and 1990s.   
Even back in the 1990s, however, it was already clear that a number of facts were 
difficult to reconcile with the prevailing view that SBTC was driving the growth in 
inequality in the United States.  A first major challenge to the 1990s consensus was that 
other large advanced economies like France, Japan, or Germany, had failed to experience 
any significant growth in inequality during the 1980s.  If technological change is the 
explanation for growing inequality, how can it be that other advanced economies subject 
to the same technological change do not experience an increase in inequality? The 
response to this question suggested by Freeman and Katz (1995) was that supply and 
demand (SBTC) were only one part of the explanation for changes in inequality. The 
other part of the explanation was wage-setting institutions.  Freeman and Katz (1995) 
suggest a richer SDI (supply, demand, institutions) explanation for diverging patterns of 
inequality across countries where common demand shock across countries are mitigated 
by supply and institutional factors.   
  For example, in ￿Anglo-Saxon￿ countries like the United States, Britain, or 
Canada where the wage-setting is decentralized and unions are weak, a negative demand   4
change depresses the wages of less-skilled workers.  By contrast, in France or Germany 
where the wage-setting is more centralized and unions are strong, wages of less-skilled 
workers remain fixed despite the same negative demand change, and so does wage 
inequality. 
  Another set of papers shows that, even in the United States, wage-setting 
institutions appear to play a substantial role in the growth in inequality.  For instance, 
both Card (1992) and Freeman (1993) conclude that the decline in unionization accounts 
for about 20 percent of the increase in the variance of log wages for U.S. males in the 
1980s.  Another important wage-setting institution is the minimum wage, which fell 
sharply (in real terms) during the 1980s.  DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) show that 
the decline in the real value of the minimum wage had a very large impact on wage 
inequality among women, and a smaller but still substantial impact among men.  This 
finding was later confirmed by Lee (1999) who concludes that all of the increase in 
inequality in the lower end of the wage distribution during the 1980s was due to the 
decline in the real value of the minimum wage.  Taken together, these results are a 
serious challenge to the view that, even in the United States, inequality growth in the 
1980s was due to a pervasive increase in the relative demand for skill, or SBTC.  Perhaps 
what happened in the low- and high-end of the wage distribution in the 1980s was instead 
a coincidence. This alternative view is that different factors affecting inequality at 
different points of the distribution all happened to move in the same direction during the 
1980s, giving the misleading impression that a single factor like SBTC was the sole 
driving force behind the increase in wage inequality.   
  A final, but more technical, point is that, even in the mid-1990s, one main stylized 
fact about inequality growth was known not to be robust to the choice of data.  As 
mentioned above, Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993) argue that within-group inequality 
had been growing in the 1970s, thereby providing evidence that the relative demand for 
skills was already increasing in the 1970s, and that the growth in inequality in the 1980s 
was not just an ￿episodic￿ phenomenon.   This finding was based on data on weekly 
earnings of full-time male workers from the March supplement of the Current Population 
Survey (CPS).  Using data on hourly wages from the May and Outgoing Rotation Group 
(ORG) Supplements of the CPS instead, both Card and Lemieux (1996) and DiNardo,   5
Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) find that within-group wage inequality did not increase for 
men (and declined for women) during the 1970s.  Though this finding was the subject of 
controversy for some time, it is now widely accepted that the growth in within-group 
inequality in the 1970s is not robust to the choice of data.
2  By contrast, the growth in 
within-group inequality in the 1980s and the evolution of the college-high school wage 
gap are very similar in the March and May-ORG CPS.   
  In summary, even at the time when SBTC emerged as the leading explanation for 
the growth in inequality, the explanation was already known to have several important 
shortcomings.  First, it could not account for the diverging patterns of inequality growth 
across advanced countries.  Second, it failed to account for the fact that institutional 
factors were also an important part of the story, especially in the lower end of the wage 
distribution.  Third, it relied in part on the unrobust fact that within-group inequality was 
already increasing in the 1970s.    
 
3. Recent evidence and further challenges to the 1990s consensus. 
a. Recent Studies 
More recently, a number of further challenges to this ￿1990s consensus￿ have emerged.  
A first challenge has to do with the timing of the growth in wage inequality.  In 
particular, Card and DiNardo (2002) and Beaudry and Green (2005) argue that much of 
the increase in the return to education was concentrated in the 1980s.  In a similar vein, 
Lemieux (2006b) shows that the growth in residual wage inequality also appears to be 
concentrated in the 1980s once composition effects are controlled for.  This evidence is 
difficult to reconcile with a simple SBTC story that would likely predict a continuing and 
steep growth in wage inequality throughout the 1990s.  For instance, Card and DiNardo 
                                                 
2 Katz and Autor (1999) re-examined the May-ORG data and concluded that within-group inequality had 
increased in the 1970s.  Based on this evidence and the earlier findings from the March CPS data by Juhn, 
Murphy, and Pierce (1993), Acemoglu (2002) concluded that ￿￿there is considerable evidence that 
residual and overall inequality started to increase during the 1970s￿, while correctly noting that ￿there is 
less uniformity among data sources regarding the behavior of residual inequality than the returns to 
schooling.￿ (Acemoglu, 2002, page 65).   This finding was based, however, on a comparison between May 
1973 data where observations with missing wages were dropped from the sample, and May 1979 data 
where missing wages were replaced by their allocated values.  Both Lemieux (2006b) and Autor, Katz and 
Kearney (2005) have now confirmed that within-group inequality does not increase in the 1970s when 
allocated wages are dropped in 1979 too (as in Card and Lemieux, 1996, or DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux, 
1996).   6
(2002) argue that ￿IT-related technological change has been going on since at least the 
1970s and has continued throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Moreover, there is some 
evidence ￿ that the rate of technological change accelerated in the 1990s, relative to the 
1980s.￿ (Card and DiNardo, 2002, page 740).  Indeed, casual evidence suggests that the 
internet revolution of the 1990s was at least as important, from the point of view of its 
impact on the workplace, as the introduction of personal computers in the 1980s.    
Mounting evidence also suggests that, far from being ￿ubiquitous￿, the growth in 
wage inequality is increasingly concentrated in the top end of the wage distribution.  For 
example, Mincer (1997) and DeschŒnes (2002) show that (log) wages are an increasingly 
convex function of years of education.  In other words, the wage gap between college 
post-graduates and college graduates has increased more than the wage gap between 
college graduates and high school graduates, which, in turn, increased more than the 
wage gap between high school graduates and high school dropouts.  Looking more 
broadly at the distribution of taxable earnings, Piketty and Saez (2003) also find that 
relative wage gains are disproportionally concentrated in the very top of the earnings 
distribution.   In more recent work, Piketty and Saez (2006) also show that the 1980s 
puzzle of why some advanced countries experienced a sharp increase in inequality while 
others did not has persisted over time.  Once again, English-speaking countries (United 
States, Canada and Britain) experienced a steep growth in inequality, as measured by the 
share of income or earnings going to the top 10 or 1 percent of the distribution.  By 
contrast, these shares have remained remarkably stable in France and Japan over the post-
war period.  
Changes in residual inequality also appear to be concentrated at the top end.  For 
instance, Lemieux (2006b) shows that within-group inequality grew substantially among 
college-educated workers but changed little for most other groups.  A related finding by 
Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2005) is that ￿top end￿ residual inequality (e.g. the difference 
between the 90
th and 50
th percentile of the distribution of residuals, or the ￿90-50￿ gap) 
increased substantially while residual inequality at the low end (the 50-10 gap) actually 
decreased. 
 
b. Direct evidence from the Current Population Survey.   7
I now present some results from the CPS to better illustrate how the main 
inequality trends have changed over time.  Figures 1 to 4 and Table 1 summarize the 
recent developments in the wage distribution and contrast them to earlier changes from 
the 1970s and 1980s.  The table and figures are based on data on hourly wages from the 
May 1973-78 and ORG 1979-2005 supplements of the CPS.  The data files are processed 
as in Lemieux (2006b) who provides detailed information on the relevant data issues.   
Table 1 shows the evolution of broad measures of wage inequality, like the 
standard deviation and the 90-10 gap in log wages, as well as wage differentials across 
education groups.  These education wage differentials are computed for each single year 
of potential labor market experience, and then averaged out over all experience groups 
using the average shares of experience over the whole 1973-2005 period.
3  The measures 
of inequality are computed separately for men and women at five different points in time: 
1973-75, 1978-80, 1988-90, 1998-2000, and 2003-2005.  The last two columns show the 
changes in the different measures of wage dispersion over the first (1973-75 to 1988-90) 
and second half (1988-90 to 2003-05) of the sample period.   
A strong pattern of results emerge from these simple comparisons.  First, the 
change in broad measures of inequality (standard deviations and 90-10 gap) is three times 
larger in the 1970s and 1980s than in the 1990s and 2000s.  Furthermore, looking more 
closely at the table indicates that all of the growth in inequality prior to 1988-90 is 
actually concentrated in the 1980s.  The pattern holds for both men and women. 
A second interesting pattern is that while both ￿low-end￿ (50-10 gap) and ￿top-
end￿ (90-50 gap) inequality were growing prior to 1988-90, the situation changes 
radically in the 1990s and 2000s.  The 50-10 gap stagnates for women and actually 
declines for men.  By contrast, the 90-50 gap keeps growing as fast in the 1990s and 
2000s as in the earlier period. 
Education wage differentials (all measured relative to high school graduates) 
exhibit essentially the same pattern as overall measures of wage inequality. Generally 
speaking, there is a steep slowdown in the growth in these differentials after 1988-90, as 
                                                 
3 This is a more general way of adjusting for experience than in a standard Mincer-type regression where a 
low level polynomial in experience is included in the regression.  The approach used here is equivalent to 
running separate regressions for each year with a full set of experience and education (five groups) 
dummies, and then averaging out (using a fixed weighted average across experience groups) the returns to 
education within each experience cell.     8
in the case of the standard deviation or the 90-10 gap.  This general pattern hides 
important differences, however, across education groups.  At the low end of the education 
distribution, the gap between high school dropouts and high school graduates expands by 
0.045 and 0.085 in the 1970s and 1980s for men and women, respectively.  As in the case 
of the 50-10 gap, however, the growth completely stops, and even reverts itself in the 
case of men after 1988-90.  At the other end of the education spectrum, the gap between 
college post-graduates and high school graduates keeps growing as fast after as before 
1988-90.  The gap between college graduates (with exactly 16 years of education) and 
high school graduates falls somewhat in the middle, as the growth in the gap slows down 
by about a half after 1988-90.   
The precise timing of these changes is illustrated in more detail in Figures 1 to 3.  
Figure 1 shows that, for men, both the 90-50 and the 50-10 gap were more or less stable 
in the 1970s, grew steeply in the 1980s, and diverged sharply after the 1980s.  While the 
50-10 gap returned to its level of the early 1970s by the mid-1990s (and stayed more or 
less constant since then), the 90-50 gap kept growing steadily and is now 40 percent 
larger than in 1973.   
Figure 2 shows that, as in the case of men, the 90-50 gap for women grew steadily 
over most of the sample period, and is now 40 percent larger than back in 1973.  The 
story for the 50-10 gap is different, however.  The 50-10 gap declined sharply in the 
1970s before increasing even more dramatically between 1979 and 1986.  Since then, the 
50-10 gap has remained more or less stable around 20 to 30 percent above its 1973 level.  
Figure 3 shows the evolution of the various education wage differentials, for men, 
relative to their 1973 level.  As in the case of the broader measures of inequality, all 
education wage gaps are stable in the 1970s, increase in the early 1980s, and diverge 
substantially after the mid-1980s.  As a result, by 2005 the gap between high school 
dropouts and high school graduates is only 20 percent above its 1973 level.  By contrast, 
the gap between college post-graduates and high school graduates in 2005 is more than 
twice as large as in 1973.  Under the assumption that a post-graduate degree requires, on 
average, 18 years of education, the 0.36 wage gap between the two groups (Table 1) in 
1973-75 corresponds to a yearly return to education of 6 percent, compared to 13 percent 
(0.77 wage gap) in 2003-2005.  Lemieux (2006a) shows that this enormous increase in   9
the return to ￿post-secondary￿ education accounts for a large share of the overall increase 
in inequality. 
In summary, the evidence from the CPS data strongly supports the findings of the 
aforementioned studies that the nature of the growth in wage inequality has changed very 
substantially over the last 15 years.  All the recent growth in inequality is concentrated at 
the top end of the distribution, in sharp contrast with the situation that prevailed prior to 
1990.  Figure 4 illustrates this dramatic change by showing the growth in real male wages 
at each percentile of the wage distribution over the two sub-periods.  As in Juhn, Murphy 
and Pierce (1993), the increase in inequality prior to 1989 is pervasive, or ubiquitous, in 
the sense that wage differentials increase at essentially all points of the distribution.  
Interestingly, however, the resulting curve obtained using the May-ORG data is not quite 
as linear as what Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993) found using the March CPS.  In fact, 
the curve for 1974 to 1989 is already convex in the sense that wage differentials in the 
low end are not expanding quite as fast as in the top end.   
The situation changes radically after 1989.  First, real wages increase at each and 
every points of the distribution, unlike prior to 1989 when real wages decreased except 
for the top 20 percent of the distribution.  More importantly, the curve is U-shaped as 
workers both in the lower and upper tails of the distribution experienced larger gains than 
workers in the middle of the distribution.  
 
4. Wage-setting institutions and the growth in top-end wage inequality 
Explaining the continuing growth in top-end inequality in the United States over the last 
15 years, in a context where inequality elsewhere in the distribution is not increasing, is 
now attracting a lot of attention.  In this section and the next, I discuss the main emerging 
explanations that have been suggested for these changes.  I stress, however, that these 
explanations have to be evaluated in a broader comparative context where two important 
factors have to be kept in mind.  First, the nature of the changes in inequality prior to 
1990 was very different from the more recent period.  A ￿good￿ explanation the post-
1990 situation should also be able to account for the very different situation that prevailed 
prior to 1990.  Second, a ￿good￿ explanation should also have something to say, if   10
possible, about why the evolution of wage inequality has been so different across 
different advanced countries. 
  In this section, I explore a number of possible explanations for the growth in top-
end inequality that revolve around the theme of wage setting institutions.  I then explore 
more standard demand and supply explanations in Section 5. 
 
a. Wage setting institutions and social norms: top executives 
  The work by Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez and their co-authors has been very 
influential in attracting attention to the issue of the growing inequality at the top end of 
the distribution.
4 The most important contribution of this branch of the literature is to 
provide good quality and comparable tax data for several countries over a long period of 
time.  As mentioned above, the main finding is that top-end inequality started increasing 
steadily in the 1980s in English-speaking countries, but remained relatively unchanged in 
other advanced countries like Japan and France. 
  Piketty and Saez (2006) discuss several possible explanations for the growth in 
top end inequality, focusing on the question of why the incomes of top end executives 
increased so much over time.  One first explanation that they end up dismissing is that 
technological change has made managerial skills more general and less firm-specific, 
thus increasing the global competition for the best executives. The problem with this 
explanation is that it, presumably, represents a world wide phenomenon that fails to 
explain why top-end earnings increased much more in some countries than in others.   
  The second, and more promising, explanation explored by Piketty and Saez is that 
changes in pay-setting institutions and social norms have removed some implicit barriers 
to higher wages in the United States, but not in other countries like France where pay-
setting institutions such as union power remained constant.  The third, and related, 
explanation is that executives got better at setting their own pay or extracting rents at the 
expense of shareholders.   
  While all these explanations are plausible, they are difficult to test for a number of 
reasons.  First, it is not clear how to measure the social norms and general pay-setting 
                                                 
4 See, for example, Piketty (2003) for France, Piketty and Saez (2003) for the United States, Saez and Veall 
(2005) for Canada, as well as the summary piece by Piketty and Saez (2006).   11
institutions that affect the pay of high executives, or to measure the capacity of 
executives to set their pay or extract rents.  Second, the major disadvantage of tax data is 
that they are not based on detailed micro-data that can then be used to test for interesting 
hypotheses.  Other data sources have to be used to make progress on these issues. 
  For example, Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005) use detailed data from the 
ExecuComp database for 1993 to 2003 to look explicitly at explanations for the large 
increase in executive pay over this period.  Using standard regression analysis, they find 
that changes in firm size, performance and industry classification fail to explain most of 
the growth in executive pay over this period.  They conclude that mean compensation in 
2003 would have only been half of its actual size had the relationship between 
compensation and firm size, performance, and industry classification remained the same 
as in 1993.  The problem is that though large (or more performing) firms pay their 
executives more than smaller firms, the elasticity is not nearly large enough for the 
growth in firm size to account for the growth in executive pay.   
Gabaix and Landier (2008) reach the very different conclusion that ￿The six-fold 
increase of CEO pay between 1980 and 2003 can be fully attributed to the six-fold 
increase in market capitalization of large U.S. companies during that period.￿ In other 
words, they find that the elasticity of pay with respect to firm size (market capitalization 
in their paper) is roughly equal to one, which is much larger than the elasticity estimated 
by Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005).  Their estimates are mostly based, however, on the 
time-series relationship between executive pay and market capitalization, a questionable 
identification strategy.
5    
 
b. Wage setting institutions for the broader workforce: unions and minimum wages 
Although the focus on top executives can help explain some of the growth in earnings at 
the very top of the distribution, executives are by no means the only workers driving 
earnings growth at the top end.  For instance, it was recently reported that Goldman and 
                                                 
5 Gabaix and Lanthier (2008) report a more standard elasticity of compensation with respect to market 
capitalization of .3 in a standard panel data regression, which is more or less comparable to Bebchuk and 
Grinstein (2005).  They include an aggregate measure of market capitalization instead of standard year 
dummies, however, and add the effect of that measure (.7) to get a ￿full￿ elasticity of about 1.  The 
problem, however, is that this purely time-series variable could also capture other proposed explanations 
(social norms, etc.) for the change in executive pay.  Without this questionable approach for estimating the 
elasticity, their results would be very much in line with those of Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005).    12
Sachs average compensation for 2006 reached over $600,000.
6  Literally thousands of 
traders, investment bankers, and managers other than the top executives of this single 
firm (those included in executive data bases) likely earned enough to put them in the top 
0.1 percent of the earnings distribution.
7 One must thus clearly broaden the analysis 
beyond top executives to understand the sources of growing inequality at the very top end 
of the distribution.   
One major limitation of most micro data sets for understanding top end inequality 
is top coding.  For example, in the March CPS, reported wages and salaries were until 
recently top-coded at $150,000 a year, which is barely above the 95
th percentile of the 
distribution of earnings in the tax data of Piketty and Saez ($125,471 in 2004).
8 One well 
known data set for which top-coding is not an issue is the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics (PSID), which is unfortunately not ideal either for studying top-end inequality 
because of smaller sample sizes.
9 But though these data sets are not very useful for 
studying changes in inequality at the very top end, they remain extremely useful for 
understanding the sources of wage movements up to, at least, the 95
th percentile of the 
wage distribution.  In the remainder of the paper I will thus focus on analyses of 
inequality based on standard data sets such as the CPS. 
As mentioned above, Piketty and Saez (2003, 2006) argue that social norms and 
institutional factors are a promising explanation for why top end inequality increased 
much more in the United States than in many other countries.  Since social norms and 
other broad institutional factors presumably affect the whole labor market in a country, it 
is not clear how one can successfully use micro data to test for the effect of these factors 
on the wage distribution.  By contrast, the more standard labor economics literature 
                                                 
6 International Herald Tribune, Dec. 13, 2006. 
7 The updated numbers of the Piketty and Saez (2003) indicate that the 99.9
th  centile of the salary 
distribution was $837,892 in 2004 (data accessed on Emmanuel Saez￿s website at: 
http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~saez/TabFig2004.xls). See also Kaplan and Rauh (2007) for some estimates of the 
contribution of high earners other than CEOs to the top end of the distribution. 
8 This is the top-code on annual earnings on the main job in the March CPS that prevailed until 2002.  The 
top-code has been revised up to $200,000 for 2002 earnings which is still, however, below the 99
th 
percentile of the distribution of earnings in the tax data of Piketty and Saez ($251,000 in 2004). The top-
code on earnings in the ORG supplement of the CPS is also $150,000 a year for individuals who have 
worked for all 52 weeks of the year (top-code of $2884.61 a week), while the top-code in the 2000 census 
is only slightly larger ($175,000 a year) than in the pre-2002 March CPS.  
9 The top-code on annual earnings in the PSID was $99,999 until 1982, which was well within the top one 
percent of the earnings distribution back then.  It was subsequently increased to very large values that only 
bind for a handful of individuals.    13
focuses on more narrowly defined institutions such as unions, minimum wages, and 
deregulation that affect some workers but not others.  As a result, the importance of these 
factors in the recent evolution of wage inequality can be readily tested for using micro 
data.  
One institutional factor that can safely be ruled out as an explanation for the 
continuing growth in top end inequality is the minimum wage.  As mentioned in Section 
2, there is strong evidence that the decline in the real value of the minimum wage played 
a major role in the increase in low-end inequality in the 1980s.  Figure 5 also shows the 
remarkable coincidence between the evolution of the minimum wage and the 50-10 gap 
for women from 1973 to 2005.  DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) and Lee (1999) 
only look at data for up to about 1990, and conclude that most of the growth in the 50-10 
gap shown in the figure was due to the decline in the minimum wage.  Figure 5 shows 
that out-of-sample predictions from these studies are highly consistent with the post-1990 
data, since both the minimum wage and the 50-10 gap remained more or less constant 
over that period.  Interestingly, both series still move together around this relatively flat 
trend for 1990 to 2005.  But since the minimum wage did not change much after 1990 
and unlikely affects top-end inequality anyway, it simply cannot account for the growth 
in top-end inequality over the last 15 years.  
A second institutional factor that unlikely accounts for recent changes in top end 
inequality after 1990 is deregulation.  Fortin and Lemieux (1997) show that industries 
that were deregulated in the late 1970s (airlines, trucking, etc.) did not experience more 
growth in inequality than industries that were unaffected by deregulation.  Given the lack 
of effects of deregulation on inequality, and the fact that deregulation mostly happened 
25 to 30 years ago, it is not a plausible explanation for recent changes in top-end 
inequality.  
A more promising explanation, at least in the case of men, is de-unionization.  As 
mentioned in Section 2, both Card (1992) and Freeman (1993) show that de-unionization 
accounts for a sizable share (up to 20 percent) of the increase in the variance of wages in 
the 1980s. DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) reach a similar conclusion but also 
explore in more detail the distributional impacts of unions on wages.  Interestingly, they 
find that the 10.8 percentage point decline in male unionization accounts for 0.040, or a   14
third, of the 0.119 increase in the 90-50 gap between 1979 and 1988.  By contrast, they 
find that de-unionization has a negative effect on the 50-10 gap, reducing it by 0.019 
during a period where the gap expanded by 0.076.  In other words, the de-unionization 
story was going the wrong way at the low end during the 1980s, though institutions as a 
whole accounted for some of the increase in low-end inequality because of the 
contribution of the declining minimum wage that accounted for 0.050 of the 0.076 
increase in the 50-10 gap.  The results from DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996) thus 
imply that the negative effect of de-unionization on low-end inequality was more than 
offset by the large effect of the declining minimum wage over this period.   
Since 1988, however, the rate of male unionization kept decreasing (by 8.6 
percentage points between 1988 and 2005 in the ORG CPS) while the minimum wage 
remained more or less constant (Figure 5).  Extrapolating the DiNardo, Fortin, and 
Lemieux (1996) results to the 1988-2005 period suggests that de-unionization can both 
explain some of the increase in top-end inequality over this period, as well as some of the 
decline in low-end inequality.  Qualitatively speaking, de-unionization works very well 
as an explanation for the changing nature of inequality since 1990 as in can both account 
for increasing inequality at the top end, and decreasing inequality at the low end.  From a 
quantitative point of view, however, the question is whether the effect of unionization is 
large enough to account for the magnitude of the recent changes in inequality? 
To answer this type of question, one could simply redo a DiNardo, Fortin, and 
Lemieux type analysis for the 1988-2005 period.  A simpler ￿back-of-the-envelope￿ 
calculation could also be performed if one knew what is the effect of unions on wages at 
different quantiles of the wage distribution.  As it turns out, Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux 
(2007) recently proposed a new unconditional quantile regression method that precisely 
yields these types of estimates.  They also apply their method to the case of unions for 
men in 1983-85, controlling for standard factors such as experience and education.  Their 
estimated effects are reproduced in Figure 6.  Since it well known since Freeman (1980) 
that unions tend to reduce wage dispersion among male workers, it is not surprising that 
the union effects in Figure 6 are larger and the low end (say 10
th percentile) than at the 
high end (say 90
th percentile) of the wage distribution.  The standard ￿within￿ effect of   15
unions can account for this pattern of results.
10  More interestingly, the effect is non-
monotonic.  It first increases to reach the 0.30 to 0.40 range between the 20
th and the 50
th 
percentiles, declines steadily after the 50
th percentile, and eventually reaches negative 
values above the 80
th percentile.  The effect is very large and negative (up to -0.30) by the 
time we reach the highest percentile shown in the figure (98
th percentile).   
Visually speaking, the effect of unions plotted in Figure 6 looks like a mirror 
image of the observed 1989-2004 change in wages (by percentiles) shown in Figure 4.  
The back-of-the-envelope calculation presented in Table 2 indeed indicates that de-
unionization can account for about of third of both the increase in top-end inequality, and 
of the decline in the low-end inequality.  Remarkably, this is very similar to DiNardo, 
Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) who also found that de-unionization accounts for a third of 
the increase in the 90-50 gap between 1979 and 1988. 
The other appealing feature of this ￿union￿ story is that the English-speaking 
countries (U.S., U.K. and Canada) where top-end inequality increased the most 
dramatically (Piketty and Saez, 2006), are also the ones where the role of collective 
bargaining in wage setting decreased the most sharply (Card, Lemieux, and Riddell, 
2003).  Unlike alternative explanations like SBTC that should, presumably, affect all 
advanced countries equally, de-unionization provides of powerful way of accounting for 
some of the changing nature of inequality within the United States, and the differential 
experience of different countries in this regard. 
 
c. Another wage-setting institution: Performance Pay 
Traditional labor market institutions like the minimum wage and unions tend to affect 
workers predominantly at the bottom or middle of the wage distribution.  By contrast, 
pay-setting mechanisms of CEOs discussed by Piketty and Saez (2003, 2006) concern 
workers at the very top of the distribution.  This raises the question of whether some pay-
setting institutions may also be affecting workers in between these two polar cases.   
                                                 
10 The overall effect of unions on wage inequality is usually understood as the interplay between the effect 
of the inequality enhancing ￿between￿ effect (union raise average wages of similar workers) and the 
inequality reducing ￿within￿ effect (union reduce wage dispersion among similar workers).  At the bottom 
of the distribution, both the within and between effects go in the same direction (raise wages of low wage 
workers), which explains why the overall effect is large of positive.  At high enough percentiles, however, 
(negative) within effects can eventually dominate (positive) between effects, explaining why the overall 
effect eventually turns negative in Figure 6.   16
  When looking at the way compensation of CEOs is set, it is clear that straight 
salaries represent only a fraction of total compensation.  Bonuses, stock options and other 
forms of compensation linked (in principle) to CEO performance now account for most 
of the compensation of top CEOs (Piketty and Saez, 2003).  Interestingly, this movement 
towards performance-pay schemes extends well beyond the small number of top CEOs.  
Using data from the PSID, Lemieux, MacLeod, and Parent (2007) show that the fraction 
of U.S. male workers on performance-pay jobs increased from about 30 percent in the 
late 1970s to over 40 percent in the late 1990s.
11  They also show that wages are less 
equally distributed on performance-pay than non performance-pay jobs, in particular 
because returns to education are higher in performance-pay jobs.   They conclude that the 
growth of performance-pay has contributed to about 25 percent of the increase in the 
variance of log wages between the late 1970s and the early 1990s. 
  Interestingly, Lemieux, MacLeod, and Parent show that most of the contribution 
of performance-pay to the growth in wage inequality is concentrated at the top end of the 
distribution.  This is consistent with their observation that workers on performance-pay 
jobs tend to be more educated and to work in higher paid occupations (professionals, 
managers, and sales workers) than workers not paid for performance.  Note also that 
since there is essentially no top-coding in the PSID (see above), that data set is well 
suited for looking at what is happening even in the very top percentiles of the wage 
distribution.  The findings of Lemieux, MacLeod, and Parent are reproduced in Figure 7, 
which shows that performance-pay accounts for very little of the changes in wage 
dispersion up to the 80th percentile. By contrast, performance-pay accounts for 
remarkably large share of the change in inequality above the 80th percentile.  Simple 
calculations based on the results reported in the Figure 7 indicate that performance-pay 
accounts for only 3 percent of the growth in the 80-10 wage gap, but for 71 percent of the 
growth in the 99-80 wage gap. 
 
d. Institutions: An Overall Assessment 
                                                 
11 Performance pay is measured by looking at whether a worker received piece rates, commissions, or 
bonuses on his current job (looking at all observations of a given worker-employer match).  Bonuses are by 
far the most important component (in terms of workers affected) of this performance-pay measure.     17
  Wage setting institutions are a fairly successful explanation for recent changes in 
inequality in the United States.  De-unionization implies increasing inequality at the top 
end but decreasing inequality at the low end, which is consistent with changes in the 
wage distribution observed over the last 15 year.  Adding another institutional factor, the 
minimum wage, can also account for the fact that inequality also expanded in the low end 
of the distribution in the 1980s, when the real value of the minimum fell sharply.  Finally, 
changes in the way wages are set due to the growth in performance-pay jobs can also help 
explain a large share of the growth in inequality above the 80th percentile of the wage 
distribution.   
  Two other advantages of the institutional explanation are that it is also consistent 
with long-run trends in inequality in the United States, and with cross-country differences 
in inequality changes over countries. On the historical side, Levy and Temin (2007) 
provide both historical and quantitative evidence that institutional changes played both a 
major role in the decline in inequality around and after World War II (the ￿Detroit 
Treaty￿ era) and in the more recent growth in inequality since 1980 (the ￿Washington 
Consensus￿ era).  
  In terms of international comparisons, Freeman and Katz (1995)’s view that 
institutional factors are an important factor for explaining cross-country differences in 
inequality changes has been confirmed in a number of recent studies. As mentioned 
above, countries (U.S., U.K. and Canada) where top-end inequality increased the most 
also experienced a decline in the importance of unions in wage setting (Card, Lemieux, 
and Riddell, 2003).  This being said, it would be incorrect to simply divide large 
advanced countries in a group of English-speaking countries (U.S., U.K. and Canada) 
that experienced institutional changes and growing wage inequality, and a group of other 
countries where both of these factors remained stable. 
  For instance, Manacorda (2004) shows that inequality first declined in Italy in the 
1970s, but subsequently increased starting in the mid-1980s. Manacorda shows 
compelling evidence that these changes are linked to the ￿rise and fall￿ of the Scala 
Mobile, a country-wide indexation system that compressed wages by awarding larger 
cost-of-living adjustments to low wage than high wage workers.  A more controversial 
case is the one of Germany where it is generally believed that unions remained strong and   18
inequality remained stable over the last few decades. Dustmann, Ludsteck and Sch￿nberg 
(2007) challenge both of these views using new and better data indicating that inequality 
in fact increased while the unionization rate declined substantially over the last twenty 
years. They also show that these two factors are clearly linked and that de-unionization 
accounts for a substantial part of the growth in inequality in Germany over this period. So 
though the pattern of change in inequality and institutions across countries is more 
complex than was previously though, the evidence remains that institutions are an 
important determinant of wage and income inequality. 
  It should be stressed, however, that even though wage setting institutions account 
well for the timing and the nature of changes in wage inequality, they typically do not 
quantitatively account for most of the observed changes in wage dispersion.  For 
example, the effect of de-unionization in the United States discussed above accounts for 
no more than a third of the change in (low-end or top-end) wage inequality. Similarly, the 
decline in the minimum wage in the 1980s only affected the low end of the wage 
distribution.  
The evidence reported here is, thus, not inconsistent with Autor, Katz and 
Kearney (2007)’s assessment that other factors beyond institutions have to account for the 
bulk of changes in inequality. Their main argument is that neither changes in the 
minimum wage nor composition effects can account for the continuing growth in top-end 
wage inequality.  One source of difference between this assessment and the evidence 
presented here is that, like Lemieux (2006b), Autor, Katz and Kearney (2007) only focus 
on composition effects due to standard human capital variables that indeed play mostly a 
role in the low end of the distribution. By contrast, de-unionization and the growth in 
performance-pay jobs can be viewed as a broader set of composition effects that also 
effect top-end inequality.  
A related point is that when Lemieux, MacLeod, and Parent (2007) separate the 
pure composition effect (higher incidence of performance pay, holding the wage structure 
constant) from the wage structure effect (faster growth in the return to skills in the 
performance-pay sector) of performance pay, they conclude that the latter effect account 
for most of the contribution of performance pay to the growth in top-end inequality. This 
means that another explanation such as SBTC needs to be introduced to explain why   19
inequality grew faster in performance-pay than in non performance-pay jobs. For all 
these reasons, I will explore in the next section other possible explanations for the 
changing nature of wage inequality that are required to complement the institutional 
explanation. 
A potentially more serious criticism of the role of institutional factors is that they 
may themselves be an endogenous response to more fundamental changes, such as 
SBTC.  In particular, Acemoglu, Aghion and Violante (2001) show that if unions 
maintain strong wage compression policies in the face of declining demand for low skill 
workers due to SBTC, this will result in de-unionization since the outside option of 
skilled workers will grow, thus undermining the coalition between skilled and unskilled 
workers in support of unions. A similar argument could be made that the growth in 
performance pay is also an endogenous response to underlying technological change.  
The main problem with this explanation is that it fails to account for long-run 
trends and international differences in institutional change. For instance, it is difficult to 
believe that the growth in the U.S. unionization rate in the 1930s and 1940s was due to 
technological change, or that unions remained strong in countries like France over the last 
20 years because there was no SBTC there. Furthermore, one could make the reverse 
argument that institutions are the underlying exogenous factor, and the technological 
change responds to constraints imposed by these institutions. For instance, firms where 
less-skilled workers are overpriced because of unions have an incentive to invest in new 
technologies that can effectively replace these less-skilled workers.  
So while it would be important and useful to better understand why institutions or 
other determinants of wage inequality differ over time and countries, these questions are 
unfortunately beyond the scope of this paper. Following the bulk of the literature, I 
simply assume that supply, demand, or institutional changes are exogenous. 
 
5. Demand Side Explanations 
As mentioned earlier, a simple and parsimonious explanation for the pervasive change in 
wage inequality of the 1980s is that workers vary according to their skill level, and that 
the price of skill increased in response to a growing relative demand for skill due, for 
example, to SBTC.  This simple model cannot account, however, for the more complex   20
change in inequality observed over the last 15 years. I now explore extensions to the 
simple model that have been suggested to explain the changing nature of wage inequality.   
 
a. Refining technological change: routine vs. skilled tasks. 
Autor, Katz and Kearney (2006) propose a richer model for explaining why workers at 
the top and bottom of the distribution did well since 1990, while workers in the ￿middle￿ 
did not do so well.  Their explanation builds on Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003) who 
convincingly argue that a simple distinction between skilled and unskilled worker is not 
rich enough to capture the effect of technological change, and in particular the computer 
revolution, on the labor market. Accordingly, they introduce an important distinction 
between routine tasks that can now be executed by computers and non-routine tasks that 
still require human labor.   
To illustrate the workings of the model, consider three types of jobs.  Type 1 jobs 
are unskilled non-routine jobs such as truck drivers or nannies that do not require a high 
level of schooling (skills) but cannot be replaced computer operated machineries.  Type 2 
jobs are more skilled but routine jobs such as traditional blue-collar jobs in the 
manufacturing industry that can, to a large extent, be replaced by computer-operated 
machinery.  Type 3 jobs are non-routine high skill jobs such as doctors or executives that 
are highly skilled and cannot be performed by computers.  Since computers can be used 
as substitutes for type 2 jobs but not for the two other job types, the introduction of 
computers should depress the wages for these kinds of jobs relative to type 1 and type 3 
jobs.   
To see how the model can account for the changes observed over that last 15 
years, assume that wages for type 2 jobs initially lie in-between those on type 1 (low 
wage) and type 3 (high wage) jobs.  The introduction of computers increases top-end 
wage inequality by expanding the wage gap between middle-wage jobs (type 2) and high-
wage jobs (type 3).  By contrast, low-end inequality decreases as wages in middle-wage 
jobs (type 2) decline relative to those at the bottom (type 1), since computers cannot be 
used as substitutes for type 1 jobs.   
While this story based on the distinction between skilled and routine tasks is 
appealing, there is not much direct empirical evidence on the precise contribution of this   21
explanation to the recent changes in wage inequality.  Following Autor, Levy and 
Murnane (2003), a natural way of approaching this issue empirically is to look at detailed 
occupations.  Using data from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT), they show 
that the share of the workforce in routine occupations has declined over time, confirming 
the view that technological change is biased against these types of jobs (as opposed to 
unskilled jobs). 
Autor, Katz and Kearney (2006) also look at detailed occupations and show that, 
since 1990, changes in occupational shares are U-shaped in the sense that it is 
occupations in the middle of the skill (or wage) distribution that declined relative to 
occupations both at the bottom and top end.  Goos and Manning (2007) also observe the 
same changes in the distribution of occupational employment in the U.K., and refer to 
these changes as a polarization of the labor market into low- and high-paying 
occupations.  
Autor, Katz and Kearney then show that changes in occupational shares were 
positively sloped (and not U-shaped) in the 1980s, suggesting that technological changes 
was of a more traditional skill-biased nature during that earlier period.  As the shapes of 
the occupational change curves in the two sub-periods closely match the shapes of the 
wage change curves (Figure 4), it is tempting to conclude that the technological change 
imbedded in the occupational change curves can account for the changing nature of wage 
inequality.  This does not say, however, what is the quantitative contribution of this 
proposed explanation to changes in wage inequality. As pointed out in Section 4, the 
effect of de-unionization is also U-shaped.  When the contribution of unionization is 
directly estimated, however, it is found to account for about a third of the changes in 
inequality.  So although it is desirable for any explanation to account for the qualitative 
features of inequality changes, whether it explains a small or a large fraction of the 
observed changes in inequality can only be assessed using more direct empirical tests.
12   
                                                 
12 One major criticism of the earlier SBTC literature is that it often tended to simply attribute changes 
unexplained by other factors to technological change, instead of coming up with precise measures of 
technological change that can then be tested on equal footing against other proposed explanations such as 
de-unionization (see Card and DiNardo, 2002, for more discussion of this).  So even though the more 
sophisticated explanation of the effect of technological change based on the distinction between skilled and 
routine tasks is intuitively appealing, there is not enough direct evidence yet to conclude that it is the main 
source of change in wage inequality over the last 15 years.   22
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to estimate the contribution of 
technological change to changes in inequality over the last fifteen year, Figures 8 and 9 
present some simple evidence from the ORG CPS data on the contribution of different 
occupations.  This provides a rough way of seeing to what extent the pattern of wage 
changes across occupations is consistent with the skill/routine technological change story.  
Figure 8 shows relative wage changes by two-digit occupation as a function of average 
education in the occupation in the base period, as well as a fitted regression of wage 
changes on a quartic in education.  Note that the base period is 1983-85 while the end 
period is 2000-2002.  These two periods are chosen because major changes in 
occupational classification before 1983 and after 2002 make it difficult to compare 
occupations over a longer time period.   
Interestingly, the fitted regression function is U-shaped, as one would expect on 
the basis of Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2006) who show that changes in relative demand 
is U-shaped.  Occupations that do the worst are those in the lower middle range of the 
skill distribution, while occupations in the lower- and, especially, upper-end of the skill 
distribution do much better. 
Occupations at the higher end of the skill distribution (doctors, lawyers, 
professors, scientists, etc.) almost all do better than average.  It is also highly plausible to 
argue that workers in these occupations mostly perform non-routine work.  A more 
disturbing pattern is that among high-skill occupations, the only ones that experience 
negative relative wage changes are precisely the ones most closely linked to the computer 
revolution.  In particular computer programmers and engineers both experience negative 
relative wage changes, despite the fact ￿indicated by the regression line￿that 
occupations with similar skills generally experience a large positive relative wage 
change.
13 The case of computer programmers is particularly striking since this is the two-
digit occupation that experienced by far the largest increase in ￿relative demand￿ as 
measured by its employment share that more than tripled (from 0.7 to 2.2 percent) over 
this period.   So while Figure 8 shows that high skill occupations where workers perform 
non-routine work did very well in terms of relative wages, it is difficult to understand 
                                                 
13 This is consistent with Card and DiNardo (2002) who also argue that the relative poor wage performance 
of technology-related occupations is hard to reconcile with the SBTC story.   23
why occupations at the core of the computer/technological revolution did relatively badly 
compared to occupations like lawyers of even professors that are relatively more 
peripheral to the computer revolution.  One possible explanation for this phenomenon 
discussed below in Section 5c is offshoring. 
Figure 9 complements Figure 8 by looking more directly at which occupations 
contribute the most to the growth in inequality at the top end of the distribution.  This is 
done by first computing the fraction of workers in each occupation who are in the top five 
percent of the overall (all occupations) wage distribution, and then graphing the change in 
this proportion over time.
14  Note that this curve cannot be U-shaped since only a very 
small fraction of workers in middle- and low-wage occupations earn more than the 95
th 
percentile.  The change in the fraction of workers in the top five percent for these 
occupations is thus very close, when not exactly equal, to zero. 
As in the case of mean wages in Figure 8, science and technology occupations 
fare relatively badly according to this alternative measure.  Computer scientists, 
engineers and natural scientists all experience a substantial decline in the fraction of their 
workers in the top 5 percent of the distribution.  By contrast, none of the four occupations 
that experience the largest growth in the fraction of their workers in the top five percent 
(doctors, lawyers, health treatment occupations and sales workers in finance, insurance, 
and real estate (FIRE)) appears to be at the core of the computer/information technology 
revolution.  
In summary, although the more sophisticated form of technological change linked 
to the distinction between skilled and routine tasks is an intuitively appealing explanation 
for the polarization of the labor market, it is not yet clear how much it explains of recent 
changes in wage inequality.  Two important challenges are to come up with more direct 
empirical tests of the effect of this type of technological change on wages, and to account 
for the puzzling behavior of the wages of computer scientists and other technology 
workers.  A related point that needs to be explored in more detail has to do with the 
timing of technological changes. In particular, it is not clear why it took until the 1990s 
for technological change to be biased against routine (as opposed to skilled) tasks and 
                                                 
14 Redoing the graph for other wage thresholds such as the 90
th percentile yield very similar results.     24
result in some polarization of the labor market, since the computer revolution is typically 
believed to have played a major role in the 1980s as well.
15  
 
b. Heterogenous returns to human capital 
  An alternative demand-based explanation suggested by Lemieux (2006a) relies on 
the idea that increases in the demand for skill can result in more inequality growth in the 
top end than in the low end of the distribution when returns to skills are heterogenous 
across workers.  Another implication of this model is that the within-group variance 
increases more for skilled than unskilled workers, an empirical regularity noted in 
Section 3 (see Lemieux, 2006b).   
To fix ideas, consider the standard human capital pricing equation:  
(1)  wit = αtai + βtSi + γtXi + eit, 
where ai is unobserved ability, Si is education, Xi is experience, and eit is a measurement 
error.  Si and Xi are entered linearly to simplify the exposition but could be replaced by 
more flexible specifications.    
This simple model is not consistent with the fact that residual wage dispersion 
increases at higher values of education (suggesting that αt is increasing), but does not 
increase at lower values of education (suggesting that αt is not increasing).  A richer 
model is clearly required to capture the changes in the wage structure observed over the 
last 15 years.   
As it turns out, equation (1) is a popular but highly restrictive version of a human 
capital model as it imposes that the return to education (βt) and experience (γt) is the same 
for all workers.
16 Incorporating heterogeneity in the return to experience and education to 
equation (1) yields the random coefficient model: 
(2)  wit = αtai+ (βtbi)Si + (γtci)Xi + eit,  
where bi and ci are the person-specific return to education and experience, respectively.  
The key implication of this model is that, consistent with empirical evidence, an increase 
                                                 
15 By contrast, Goos and Manning (2007) find that the polarization of the labor market grew smoothly over 
both the 1980s and the 1990s in Britain.  
16 Mincer (1974) argues that returns to potential experience are higher for individuals who invest more in 
on-the-job training than for workers who invest less.  Similarly, Becker (1967) develops a human capital 
investment model where workers have heterogenous returns to education and discount rates.  The fact that 
different people face different returns to education is also front and central in the literature on the 
estimation of the causal effect of education on earnings (see, for example, Card, 2001).   25
in the price of education, βt, increases both the level and the wage dispersion of highly- 
relative to less-educated workers.  To see this, consider the conditional mean and 
variance of wages under the assumption that the random effects ai, bi, and ci are 
uncorrelated and that they have a mean of one (normalization):   
(3) E(wit | Si, Xi) =  αt + βtSi + γtXi,  










Consider the variance term linked to education, (βt
2σb
2)Si
2.  Since this term depends on 
education squared, it follows that i) the variance should be larger for more-educated 
workers, and ii) there should be a larger increase in the variance of more-educated 
workers when the price of education, βt, increases.  In this model, an increase in the price 
of education can, therefore, potentially explain the pattern of change in both between- 
and within-group differentials without resorting to an increase in the price of unobserved 
ability, αt.   
  Since the link between (log) wages and schooling has become increasingly 
convex over the 1980s and 1990s (Mincer, 1997, and DeschŒnes, 2002), Lemieux 
(2006a) implements empirically the model of equation (3) and (4) using either a quadratic 
specification or a linear spline in education.  His findings indicate that the increase in the 
return to postsecondary education (more than high school) accounts for a substantial part 
of the increase in both the between- and within-group components of wage inequality.  
The main contribution to the within-group component is to explain why this component 
increases much more among more- than less- educated workers.   
  While this approach is another appealing explanation for the fact that inequality 
increased more at the top end than at the low end of the distribution over the last 15 
years, it is not clear why the return to post-secondary education has increased so much 
while returns to other dimensions of skill did not.   One potential explanation is again the 
model of technological change of Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003). If jobs that require 
post-secondary education are typically ￿non-routine￿ jobs, while jobs that only require 
high school education tend to be more of the ￿routine￿ type, then computerization can 
result in an increase in the demand for post-secondary (non-routine) skills.   
  Note that even if this more sophisticated source of technological change was 
indeed the driving force behind recent changes in inequality, it would still be useful to   26
combine this explanation with the heterogenous returns story to account for changes in 
the within-group variance across skill groups.  To see this, consider Figure 10 that shows 
the change in the within-group variance of wages for the same two-digit occupations used 
in Figures 8 and 9.  The figure shows a very strong link between the growth in the within-
occupation variance and the average level of education in the occupation.  In fact, the R-
square of the fitted regression shown in Figure 10 is larger than in corresponding 
regression (shown in Figure 8) for the change in occupation mean wages.  Understanding 
why the pattern of change in the variance is so closely linked to education must be an 
important element of any credible explanation for the observed changes in wage 
inequality. 
 
c. Other demand explanations 
  Some studies have suggested that Rosen (1981)￿s famous theory of ￿Superstars￿ 
could explain why some highly talented individuals at the very top end have done so well 
over the last few decades.
17  This is obviously a natural explanation for classic cases of 
superstar markets like professional athletes, movies actors, or singers, though the most 
important technological revolutions in these sectors (e.g. television) probably happened 
quite some time ago.  The one sector where more recent technological change may have 
resulted in superstar effect is software development, for example the case of computer 
game developers.  As seen in Figures 8 and 9, however, computer programmers don￿t 
appear to have made much of a contribution to the growth in inequality at the top end.  
By contrast, doctors did much better despite the fact that Rosen (1981) mentions that 
profession as a leading example where superstar effects are unlikely to happen.  The 
paper by Gabaix and Landier mentioned earlier discusses another possible source of 
superstar effects, this time in the global market for executives.  One possible argument is 
that globalization leads to much larger firms where it is more critical than before to have 
a ￿star￿ CEOs.  In addition to the empirical issues raised earlier, however, it is not clear 
why this explanation is particularly well suited for the last 15 years since large 
multinational firms have been around for a long time.  
                                                 
17  Dew-Becker and Gordon (2005) mention the superstar phenomena as a possible source of growth in top-
end inequality.   27
A perhaps more promising explanation linked to globalization is the more recent 
phenomena of offshoring.  In fact, Levy and Murnane (2006) argue that the offshoring 
explanation to growing inequality is closely linked to the technological change 
explanation based on the model of Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003). The idea is that 
routine jobs that can be ￿coded up￿ and replaced by computers are also typically the 
easiest ones to offshore.  Offshoring could also potentially explain some of the anomalies 
documented in Figures 8 and 9.  For instance, even if computer programmers and 
scientists do skilled non-routine work, it may be relatively easy to offshore this R&D 
work to India or Eastern Europe.  By contrast, one cannot offshore the services performed 
by doctors, lawyers, and professors nearly so easily.   
Feenstra and Hanson (2003) show that offshoring and, more generally, trade in 
intermediate goods provides a more compelling empirical role for the effect of trade on 
wage inequality than more traditional explanations based on the trade in final goods.  It 
would be interesting to see whether this ￿new￿ trade channel can also help account for 
the fact that the more recent growth in inequality has been concentrated at the top end of 
the distribution. 
One final demand side explanation suggested by Manning (2004) is that the 
growth in earnings at the top end of the distribution due, for instance, to SBTC, has 
resulted in an increased demand for services consumed by high-income people. To the 
extent that these services are provided by low-income workers (gardeners, nannies, etc.), 
the growing demand for these services may have increased wages at the bottom end, but 
not in the middle end, of the distribution. The implied wage changes under this scenario 




During the 1980s, there was a pervasive growth in wage inequality throughout the whole 
wage distribution.  By contrast, inequality growth since 1990 has been concentrated in 
the top end of the distribution, while inequality in the low end of the distribution 
declined, at least for men.  These recent developments are not consistent with standard 
models of SBTC that were suggested as the leading explanation for the growth in   28
inequality in the 1980s. Another limitation of the SBTC explanation is that it cannot 
explain very well why, unlike the United States and the United Kingdom, some advanced 
countries experience little change in wage inequality during this period. 
  An alternative explanation that was suggested to explain inequality growth in the 
1980s is based on changes in labor market institutions.  I argue in this paper that, unlike 
SBTC, the institutional change explanation can help explain why inequality changes 
became concentrated in the top end after 1990, and why inequality grew more in the 
United States and the United Kingdom than in other advanced countries.  This being said, 
just like in the 1980s, available estimates indicate that institutional change can only 
account for about a third of the observed recent changes in wage inequality.  I also show, 
however, that broadening the traditional institutional explanation to include pay setting 
mechanisms such as performance pay can help explain more of the growth in inequality 
at the top end. 
  A number of other explanations have also been suggested for explaining the 
changing nature of wage inequality.  One possible way of ￿rescuing￿ the SBTC 
explanation is to introduce a richer form of technological change based on the distinction 
between skilled and routine tasks.  A closely related explanation is linked to offshoring.  
In both cases, however, we do not yet have detailed decompositions showing exactly how 
much of the recent changes in inequality can be attributed to these factors.  It will be 
important to estimate the precise explanatory power of these explanations in future 
research.  To be empirically successful, these explanations will also have to explain why 
the within-group variance increased so much more among highly-educated workers than 
among less-educated workers.   A promising way of addressing this issue is to use a 
model where returns to skill are heterogeneous across workers. 
  For the time being, however, most of the growth in top-end inequality over the 
last 15 years remains unaccounted for.  It may be due to more general institutions and 
social norms, technological change, offshoring, or something else.  Short of coming up 
with more direct empirical tests, there is no reason to privilege one explanation over 
another a priori. I provide a number of possible research directions in the paper that may 
hopefully help direct future empirical work.  One of the most fruitful research direction 
would be to study in more detail the recent experience of countries other than the United   29
States. International comparisons are a very powerful way of separating explanations that 
have similar implications in all countries, like technological change, from those that have 
more country-specific implications, like social norms and institutions. 
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Table 1: Summary Measures of Wage Inequality 
        Change: 
  1974 1979 1989 1999 2004  1974 to 1989 to
                  1989 2004
A. MEN           
           
Standard deviation  0.501 0.499 0.571 0.580 0.598 0.072 0.027
90-10 gap  1.266 1.262 1.486 1.487 1.557  0.224 0.071
50-10 gap  0.681 0.693 0.787 0.721 0.729  0.094 -0.058
90-50 gap  0.585 0.569 0.699 0.767 0.828  0.130 0.129
   
Gap relative to HS graduates   
 High school dropouts  -0.246 -0.253 -0.297 -0.295 -0.287 -0.045 0.010
 Some college  0.116 0.108 0.165 0.168 0.183  0.058 0.018
 College graduates  0.369 0.328 0.466 0.521 0.545  0.138 0.079
 Post-graduates  0.365 0.361 0.568 0.715 0.766 0.207 0.198
   
B. WOMEN   
   
Standard deviation  0.435 0.414 0.512 0.531 0.549 0.098 0.037
90-10 gap  1.033 0.989 1.314 1.353 1.404  0.325 0.090
50-10 gap  0.470 0.409 0.633 0.605 0.633  0.223 0.001
90-50 gap  0.564 0.580 0.681 0.748 0.770  0.101 0.089
   
Gap relative to HS graduates   
 High school dropouts  -0.221 -0.191 -0.275 -0.275 -0.281 -0.085 -0.005
 Some college  0.164 0.141 0.212 0.193 0.204  0.070 -0.008
 College graduates  0.376 0.311 0.459 0.534 0.547  0.149 0.088
 Post-graduates  0.558 0.489 0.629 0.770 0.790 0.140 0.161
                       
Notes: Measures computed by pooling groups of three year centered around the year listed in the 
table.  For example, ￿1974￿ corresponds to year 1973 to 1975, etc. 
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Table 2: De-unionization and 1988-2005 Changes in Male Wage Inequality 
   Wage  gap: 
     50-10  90-50  90-10 
       
Effect of Unions:    0.139  -0.469  -0.330 
       
Change in wage gap  -0.037  0.119  0.082 
       
Change in unionization rate  -0.086  -0.086  -0.086 
       
Predicted effect of de-unionization -0.012  0.040  0.028 
(effect in %)    32.3  33.9  34.7 
             
Notes: Changes in wage gap taken from Figure 4.  Effect of unions computed using estimates 
provided in Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2007).  Change in unionization rate computed using 
1988 and 2005 ORG supplements of the CPS. The predicated effect of de-unionization is the 
product of the union effect (first column) and of the change in the unionization rate (third 
column). 
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Figure 7: Pay-for-Performance and the 1976-79 to 1990-93 Change in 
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Figure 9: Change in the Fraction in the Top 5 percent by Two-Digit 





















































Figure 10: Change in Within-Group Variance by Two-Digit 
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